



















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2322 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 










In a careful and thorough empirical study, Christopher Udry (1996) shows convincingly that, 
in a large sample of West African households, household resource allocations were not Pareto 
efficient. This paper argues that observation of the Pareto inefficiency of a household resource 
allocation does not however refute the hypothesis that it chooses this resource allocation as if 
it maximises some form of household welfare function possessing the Pareto property. To 
refute that hypothesis it is necessary to show that the observed allocation does not represent a 
second best optimum. For this it will be necessary to show that the estimated parameters of 
the model lie in a region of the parameter space for which the second best optimality of the 
allocation does not hold. 
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May 29, 2008 1 Introduction
In a careful and thorough empirical study, Christopher Udry1 shows convinc-
ingly that, in a large sample of West African households, household resource al-
locations were not Pareto e¢ cient. Speci￿cally, plots of land farmed by women
within a household were signi￿cantly less productive than plots farmed by men
in the same household, yields on "male" land were much higher than yields
on "female" land, and there would be a signi￿cant increase in output if land
were reallocated from women to men.2 Since the leading theories of the house-
hold "assume Pareto e¢ ciency", this is interpreted as powerful evidence against
these theories. For example, the Nash bargaining models of Manser and Brown
(1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Lundberg and Pollak (1993), Chen and
Woolley (2001) and Alesina et al. (2007), since they take the Nash product
as the household￿ s maximand, can be said to be "assuming Pareto e¢ ciency".3
Should we therefore accept Udry￿ s conclusion that "this [evidence] implies that
the conventional pooling model of household resource allocation is false and both
cooperative bargaining models and the more general model of e¢ cient house-
hold allocations are inadequate for describing the allocation of resources across
productive activities in households"?
One problem with this interpretation of Udry￿ s results is that in the existing
literature there is ambiguity, sometimes bordering on confusion, about what
precisely is meant by "assuming Pareto e¢ ciency". In this paper we ￿rst re-
solve this ambiguity and show that, convincing as it is, Udry￿ s evidence does
not refute the models in the way that is claimed. We then put forward a gen-
eral model, which nests existing household models as special cases, use this to
analyse the resource allocation decisions that are the subject of Udry￿ s study,
and then derive conclusions on exactly what empirical evidence would indeed be
inconsistent with this model. The aim is not to "rescue" any particular model,
but to clarify exactly what evidence would refute it, by deriving the model￿ s
testable implications in the decision situation presented by Udry.
2 Pareto E¢ ciency
To resolve the ambiguity concerning the meaning of "assuming Pareto e¢ ciency"
it is useful to recall the distinction, familiar in Welfare Economics, between the
Pareto property of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (SWF) and the
￿rst or second best Pareto e¢ ciency of a speci￿c resource allocation achieved
by an economic system. Almost all forms of SWF have the Pareto property
that the function is strictly increasing in the utilities of the individuals in the
1Udry (1996)
2The study controls very carefully for variables such as soil fertility, crop type and di⁄er-
ences in production technolgy that might account for these di⁄erences.
3Although Lundberg and Pollak and Chen and Wooley, in contrast to the two earlier
papers, base the threat points on non-cooperative behaviour within the household rather than
utilities achieved within an alternative household.
2economy.4 However, whether a resource allocation that maximises the SWF is
￿rst or second best Pareto e¢ cient depends on the constraints imposed on the
feasible set of resource allocations. It is perfectly possible to have a second best,
i.e. "Pareto ine¢ cient", resource allocation when maximising a SWF possessing
the Pareto property. Observed Pareto ine¢ ciency does not therefore refute the
hypothesis that the SWF possesses that property.
This is precisely the case identi￿ed by Udry in his empirical analysis of
household allocations. Think of a household as a small economy.5 The models
referred to by Udry, which we call cooperative models, have the property that the
household is assumed to maximise a type of SWF, which we call the Household
Welfare Function (HWF), and this possesses the Pareto property.6 If the only
constraints considered in the household￿ s allocation decisions are on the technol-
ogy of household production and a budget constraint, then the allocation will
be (￿rst best) Pareto e¢ cient. If however there are reasons to impose further
constraints on the problem, as indeed there are in the households analysed in
Udry￿ s study, then we should not expect a Pareto e¢ cient outcome, but this
does not refute the hypothesis that the household maximises a HWF possessing
the Pareto property.7 To establish what would refute the hypothesis of HWF
maximisation, we have to formulate explicitly a model incorporating the second
best constraints, derive the equilibrium resource allocation, and specify testable




Udry analyses a rich dataset giving information on landholdings, input quan-
tities and output yields for a large sample of households in the West African
country of Burkino Faso. The plots of land farmed by a given household can
be divided into those controlled by the men in the household and those by the
women. By comparing inputs and yields of plots planted to the same crop by the
same household in a given year, he is able to show that the gender of the person
controlling the land exerts a signi￿cant in￿ uence on the yield: Men￿ s plots yield
signicantly higher outputs than women￿ s plots. Pareto e¢ ciency would there-
fore require a reallocation of inputs across plots. However, it is not possible for
this reallocation to be brought about by contracts. If for example women￿ s land
4The Rawlsian form is the exception: the function is weakly increasing in all utilities and
strictly increasing only in the utility of the worst-o⁄ member.
5This idea goes back at least to Samuelson (1956).
6For further discussion of this point see Apps and Rees (2007a) and (2007b).
7Another example of this is the Nash bargaining model of Chen and Woolley, which does
not have a Pareto e¢ cent allocation even though the maximand possesses the Pareto property.
This is essentially because bargaining is constrained to be about income shares rather than
consumption allocations, and, given their income shares, individuals choose contributions to
a household public good non-cooperatively.
3were to be worked by men, it would come to be seen as land under the men￿ s
control. To retain their rights over the land, women are constrained to work it
themselves. This seems to be the essential constraint, arising out of an absence
of contractual possibilities, that creates the second best situation.
The initial allocation of land appears to be determined by the marriage
market, and control over land appears to be what determines the individual￿ s
in￿ uence over the household resource allocation - for example, her bargaining
power if we are working within the framework of a bargaining model. That
is, the amount of land under one￿ s control is an extrahousehold environmental
parameter (EEP) in the terminology of McElroy (1990). Thus, the reason a
woman would not let a man take over the working of her land is that it would
consequently worsen her position within the household. Even though it would
increase the total value of household output, and so, given her initial power
within the household, could increase her immediate consumption, in the future
this power would decline and the subsequent worsening of her consumption share
deters her from agreeing to the transfer of land in the ￿rst place.
We model the situation described by Udry in a simpli￿ed way, which how-
ever is meant to capture its essential espects. The household consists of one
man and one woman8 It seeks to maximise a HWF de￿ned on their utilities,
with exogenously given land ownership entering as variables that determine the
household￿ s preference ordering over the utility pairs of its members. Each sup-
plies a ￿xed amount of labour to farming.9 The crop is partly consumed in the
household and partly sold on the market, and the revenue ￿nances purchases of
a market consumption good and the other factor of production, fertiliser.10 The
HWF possesses the Pareto property, but the allocation of land is not Pareto ef-
￿cient: marginal and average productivities of land farmed by men exceed those
of women at the exogenously given land allocation. We characterize this second
best equilibrium, and show what must be true empirically if this equilibrium
is indeed to result from the model. This then suggests what data need to be
collected and how these should be used to test whether this model is to be
rejected.
B. Model
The individual utility functions are ui(xi;yi); i = f;m; with x a numeraire
market good and y consumption of the good produced by the household, which
is also a cash crop. The amounts qi of this good are produced and
P
i(qi￿yi) > 0
is sold on the market at the given price p. The individual outputs are given by
qi = h(l0
i;ai;zi) i = f;m (1)
where h(:;:) is an increasing, concave production function, l0
i is the ￿xed labour
time spent working the land, ai is the amount of land cultivated by i = f;m
8In fact, in the sample, each man has on average 1.8 wives, and children also work on the
land.
9There is no outside labour market.
10Udry shows that much more fertiliser is used on land farmed by men than by women.
4and z is the amount of fertiliser, bought at price w: We normalise total land
supply to 1, so that am = 1 ￿ af: Finally the household budget constraint is
X
i=f;m
(xi + wzi) ￿ p
X
i=f;m
(qi ￿ yi) (2)
It has no non-labour income.
To capture the idea that a current transfer of land cultivation from women
to men reduces a woman￿ s future in￿ uence over the household resource alloca-
tion, we take a two period model, with t = 1;2 denoting the time period. As
Udry argues, there are no capital markets available, and so we rule out any
borrowing or lending between the two periods. We assume that in each period
the household maximises its HWF given by H(uf;um;af): The HWF11 is qua-
siconcave in utilities for every af 2 [0;1], and possesses the Pareto property






] > 0 (3)
This simply says that the household￿ s marginal rate of substitution between the
utilities of its members depends on the land allocation: In the (uf;um)-plane
a reduction in af ￿ attens the household￿ s indi⁄erence curves, along any one of
which the value of H is constant. This means for example that holding constant
the utility possibility set of the household, with utility functions chosen such that
the upper boundary of this set is strictly concave, a reallocation of land from f
to m leads to a new household equilibrium in which f￿ s utility is reduced and m￿ s
utility increased. On the other hand of course, if this land reallocation increases
production e¢ ciency, it shifts the utility possibility frontier outward. Whether
f ends up better or worse o⁄ as a result depends on the relative distributional
and e¢ ciency e⁄ects, while m will certainly be better o⁄. We interpret the
allocation observed by Udry as corresponding to the case in which the household
does not to make this land reallocation, because f is made worse o⁄ and her
initial ownership of land gives her su¢ cient power within the household to be
able to refuse to make the land reallocation. We now formalize this idea and
investigate what observations would have to be made to reject this hypothesis.
Status Quo:
In this case, the one we claim is observed by Udry, f retains her land endow-
ment in both periods. Since we assume no changes in preferences or technology
over time, there is the same Pareto ine¢ cient household resource allocation in
both periods.






(pqi ￿ wzi) s:t: qi = h(l0
i;a0
i;zi) i = f;m (4)
11Of course in general both of the ai would enter this function, but given the relationship
between them it is su¢ cient to include only af:
5where a0
i are the exogenously given initial land allocations. We denote the
resulting maximised net income by ￿0: Clearly only the fertiliser input will sat-








i are the second best optimal
fertiliser inputs, and so land should be reallocated from women to men on ef-
￿ciency grounds, since this would shift out the household￿ s budget constraint,
which can now be written as
X
i=f;m
(xi + pyi) ￿ ￿0 (5)




subject to this budget constraint in each period, yielding the optimal consump-
tions x0
i;y0
i ; which are the same in each period. Here, ￿ represents the relative
length of the two periods.12 Denote by u0
i1;u0
i2; i = f;m the utilities achieved
at the solution to this problem in periods 1 and 2 respectively.
Pareto E¢ ciency:







(pqi ￿ wzi) s:t: qi = h(l0
i;ai;zi) i = f;m
X
i=f;m
ai = 1 (7)








and the resulting net income by ￿￿: This de￿nes in each period the budget con-
straint X
i=f;m
(xi + pyi) ￿ ￿￿ (8)
Now, while in the ￿rst period f0s initial endowment of land a0
f still determines
the distribution of consumption in the household, both parties realise that if m
takes control of the Pareto e¢ cient land quantity a￿
m > a0
m in the ￿rst period,
it is the land quantity 1￿a￿
m = a￿
f < a0
f that will enter the HWF in the second




subject to the budget constraint (8) in each period. Denote the utilities resulting
from solution of this problem by u￿
i1;u￿
i2; i = f;m: If in reality the status quo
prevails, this must imply that the loss of utility to f in the second period, as
compared to the status quo, is not compensated by the gain she would make
12If future utilities are discounted, ￿ can be thought of as an annuity factor, otherwise
simply as the relative length of time over which f￿ s power would be reduced if she agreed to
the land reallocation.
6from sharing in the fruits of the greater e¢ ciency in production. Formally, the











It is clearly an empirical matter as to whether this inequality will hold, but it is







f): Thus it is in principle testable. The evidence must show that
the inequality in (10) did not hold when the status quo was observed, if it is to
reject the model.
4 An Example: Nash Bargaining
We now make this argument more concrete, and clarify the data that would be
required to reject the model, by taking a speci￿c example of a HWF that has
appeared prominently in the literature, the case of Nash bargaining. In this
case the HWF takes the form
H = [uf ￿ vf(af)][um ￿ vm(af)] (11)
where the vi(af) are threat points to be determined. For simplicity we take
identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions of the form ui = xyi; i = f;m; where
x is now taken as a household public good13 We solve the model in three steps:
Consumption allocation: For arbitary values of af and ￿ and for given threat
points, maximising the HWF in (11) subject to the budget constraint
x + p(yf + ym) ￿ ￿ (12)



















Thus asymmetries in consumption depend directly on inequalities in the threat







(vf + vm)]2 (14)
Production allocation: We simplify the earlier more general model by as-





i ￿ 2 (0;1) (15)
with k0
f < k0
m: Thus the k0
i represent the ￿xed contributions to output of the
labour used in production14, those of males having higher productivity than
13This simpli￿es the modelling of the way in which gains from cooperating in the household
can be achieved.
14They can be thought of as (l0
i)￿i; i = f;m; with ￿i 2 (0;1). Then higher male productivity
could re￿ect one or both of l0
m > l0
f and ￿m > ￿f:
7those of females. Since Udry has shown that the greater productivity of plots
farmed by males is not due to di⁄erences in soil fertility etc., we take the expo-
nent on land, ￿; the same for both male and female land. We denote by q0
i the
outputs resulting from using the given amounts of land a0
i in production, and












ai = 1 (16)
giving the optimal allocations
a￿
m = (1 + ￿)￿1; a￿
































Threat Points: We assume that failure to agree implies simply that each con-
sumes the bundle of goods that can be produced from his or her own resources,
implying of course that the household public good is excludable even though














when doing so with the Pareto e¢ cient allocations a￿
i: Solving the problem
maxxiyi s:t: xi + pyi ￿ ￿i (23)
for ￿i 2 f￿0
i;￿￿












￿00 as the value of the HWF when a0
f determines both the consumption
allocation and the net income ￿0, as under the status quo in both time periods;
8￿0￿ as the value of the HWF when a0
f determines the consumption allocation
but a￿
f determines the net income ￿￿; as in the ￿rst period of Pareto e¢ ciency;
￿￿￿ as the value of the HWF when a￿
f determines both the consumption
allocation and the net income ￿￿ as in the second period of Pareto e¢ ciency,
we need to test the counterpart of (10), the inequality
(1 + ￿)￿00 ￿ ￿0￿ + ￿￿￿￿ (25)
To do this, note ￿rst that it is equivalent to15
￿(￿00 ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿00 > 0 (26)
which gives the necessary condition
￿00 ￿ ￿￿￿ > 0 (27)
If this is satis￿ed, then whether or not (25) holds depends on whether ￿ T
(￿0￿ ￿ ￿00)=(￿00 ￿ ￿￿￿); and if it is not satis￿ed, then for all ￿ the model is
















































The left hand side is exogenously given and takes on its maximum value of 1/4
at a0
f = 1=2: The right hand side is the ratio ￿=(1 + ￿)2 and therefore depends
on the values of k0
f=k0
m and ￿: The following table gives, for a reasonable range
of values of k0
f=k0
m and ￿; critical values of a0
f such that (29) is satis￿ed for any
a0
f greater than that shown in the table.
Table 1 Critical values of a0





m = 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
￿ = 0:3 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.15 0.07
0.4 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.06
0.5 0.45 0.30 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.04
0.6 0.44 0.37 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.02
The table shows that the model is refutable: for any given cell in the table, a
lower value of the initial landholding a0
f than that appearing in that cell would
imply rejection of the model. Given the assumptions on model structure, we
see that essentially all that is required to test the model would be the data on
actual landholdings a0
f and estimates of the production function, since these
would yield the values of k0
f=k0
m and ￿:
15The second inequality holds here because an increase in production e¢ ciency and therefore
￿ with threat points ￿xed always increases the value of the Nash product at the optimum.
16Analysis of the converse case proceeds along the same lines.
95 Conclusions
The basic contention of this paper is that observation of the Pareto ine¢ ciency
of a household resource allocation does not in itself refute the hypothesis that
it chooses this resource allocation by maximising some form of HWF possessing
the Pareto property, subject to whatever constraints it in fact faces. To refute
that hypothesis it is necessary to show that the observed allocation does not
represent a second best optimum. For this it will in turn be necessary to specify
functional forms for the HWF, individual utility functions, and the production
functions, as well as the nature of the second best constraints, and to show that
the estimated parameters of these lie in a region of the parameter space for
which the second best optimality of the allocation does not hold. Even then of
course, it would only be that speci￿c model with its assumptions on functional
forms that would have been rejected. However, since the set of models that have
been proposed in the literature is reasonably small, the testing process would
seem to be manageable, given availability of the required data.
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